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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Illegal Search and Seizure-The rule announced
in Mapp v. Ohio will not be used to overturn any conviction finally
adjudicated before Mapp v. Ohio was decided.
Linkletter v. Walker, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731 (1965).
This past June the United States Supreme Court decided that the land-
mark case of Mapp v. Ohio' would not be applied retrospectively to
state convictions which had become final before the decision in Mapp
was rendered. By so deciding, the Court disposed of "... a most trouble-
some question in the administration of justice .,,I
Petitioner Linkletter, suspected of burglary, was arrested in New
Orleans on August 16, 1958, where he was taken to jail and searched.
Keys were taken from his person and used to gain access (without a
search warrant) to his personal effects, certain of which were then ad-
mitted into evidence at his trial as part of a lawful search and seizure
under Louisiana law. He was convicted of burglary, the conviction was
affirmed on appeal, and on March 21, 1960, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana denied his petition for a rehearing.3 On June 19, 1961, Mapp
was decided, and petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus-he
was refused, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would not give him
the benefit of a retrospective overruling,4 thus forcing the Supreme Court
to decide whether it would apply Mapp to state convictions which had
become final before June 19, 1961.
In a very able opinion by Mr. Justice Clark the Court decided the
question in the negative. By way of introduction, "final decision" was
defined as a decision in which ". . . the judgment of conviction [has been]
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition
for certiorari . . . elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio."' The
Supreme Court then proceeded to show that courts have long had the
power to overrule cases retrospectively, 6 and that the Supreme Court it-
self has often given effect both to changes in the law7 and to new judicial
decisions that overrule earlier controlling ones' while a case is under direct
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)..
2. Linkletter v. Walker, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731 (1965).
3. - La. -. The seizure in the Mapp case occurred on May 23, 1957; the Supreme
Court of Ohio made its final adjudication on March 23, 1960.
4. 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963); but the court did say that the search and seizure were
illegal.
5. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 2, at 1734, n.5.
6. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (dissenting opinion of
Holmes, f.).
7. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
8. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
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review. However, it was also shown that no court, including the Supreme
Court, is bound to overrule cases retrospectively since courts enjoy a
somewhat limitless freedom of choice in the matter and may do as they
see fit so as to avoid any injustice or hardship that they feel may possibly
result.' As far as any rule in this area may be stated, the Court arrived at
the conclusion that retrospective decision-making really depends upon
factors unique to each particular case and upon the varying demands of
public policy.' ° Having considered the essential factors that relate to
retrospective decision-making, and having logically shown that the
Court "has the right" to decide this case either way, the Court then con-
sidered the "factors unique to the particular case and the varying de-
mands of public policy." It is here that the two bases for the present deci-
sion appear. First, the line of development of the exclusionary rule is
discussed, with the Court emphasizing the confused state of affairs that
existed prior to Mapp, focussing great attention on Wolf v. Colorado,"
where it was decided that the fourth amendment guarantees applied
to the states, but that the exclusionary rule was not essential to these
guarantees. Wolf was the law for twelve years, and the Court realized
that thousands of cases had been decided upon it; to give Mapp retro-
spective effect would thus require a great many hearings and trials which
would tax the state and federal courts unbearably. Secondly, the Court
determined that the main function of Mapp was to deter police lawless-
ness; to free those convicted before Mapp was decided would not further
this end, nor would it result in any benefit to those affected, who were
given all the benefits of due process then available to them, because
".. . [r]eparation comes too late. . . . [to] be served by the wholesale
release of ... guilty victims."'1 2 Finally, by stressing that the date of deci-
sion is the only significant date to consider, the Court summarily
dismissed Linkletter's last contention that Mapp applied since the search
and seizure there antedated the one in his case.
Although this decision was virtually unanimous,"8 it will no doubt
generate a fair amount of controversy. The Court in the past had not
balked at applying constitutional rules to "finalized" cases 4 and had
gone so far as to order new trials for defendants who had been convicted
twenty to twenty-five years earlier by means of coerced confessions, 5
which shows that what the Court was concerned with here did not always
concern it in the past. Furthermore, it hardly seems just that the treat-
9. Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
10. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
11. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
12. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 2, at 1742.
13. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in Mr. Justice Black's dissent.
14. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), where the conviction was collaterally
attacked by post-conviction remedies; Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
15. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
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ment of two people (Miss Mapp and Mr. Linkletter) in identical situa-
tions should be merely a function of the efficiency of a state's judicial
system, as Mr. Justice Black's dissent points out."6 As well-founded as
all of these arguments are, however, it must be borne in mind that the
problem confronting the Court was a serious one, and the pragmatic
considerations concerning the administrative side of the judicial system
alone go far toward meeting the critics' arguments. Also, although one
may say that this decision breaks precedent, it must be remembered that
in this area of the law there is ample historical background stretching
over hundreds of years for doing so." Finally, a decision in a case like this
is composed of a large amount of value judgment, which makes it ame-
nable to the barbs of criticism. This particular decision, though, is favored
with a thorough logical and historical style and composition that, upon
reflection, make it much easier for the reader to fully understand the
thought-process of Mr. Justice Clark and the full import of what he is
trying to convey. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the decision, and thus the
starting-point for most of the criticism, is that its pragmatic aspect has
the very unpragmatic effect of keeping the jails full while attempting to
keep the courts empty. While this is deplorable in many respects, one
cannot quarrel with the Court's desire to be of assistance to an already
overworked judiciary, nor can one fail to realize that in this area of con-
stitutional development the Supreme Court is experiencing somewhat
rapid and far-reaching changes, the material effect of which must also be
dealt with. While the decision may appear to fly in the face of "what is
right," the nature and importance of the question and the scrupulously
correct means used to decide it are such as to blunt the arguments of its
opponents upon a fair legal appraisal of all that is involved.
Samuel J. Pasquarelli
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Right to Counsel-The United States Supreme
Court, in making an accused's right to confront witnesses a fundamental
right applicable to the states, unnecessarily extended constitutional law.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965).
In April of this year, the Supreme Court of the United States in Pointer
v. Texas' rendered a decision which resulted in the application of another
constitutional provision to the states. Now, the right of an accused to
confront witnesses against him can be enforced in any state court as
well as in the federal courts.
16. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 2, at 1744.
17. 1 BLACKSTONE, CO JNTARims.69 (15th ed. 1809).
1. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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